It certainly was for me!
Concorde entered service in 1976 so not likely in the mid 80s. One takeoff before entry into service the aircraft would have been light, no passengers or luggage and likely a low fuel load for short distance flight so climb could have been very steep.
But even my full flight with a full fuel load for a transatlantic flight had far more takeoff acceleration and steeper climb than I'm used to. Not only could you really feel the acceleration on roll down the runway, when they switched off the reheat (afterburners in US speak) a few minutes into the flight you could feel the reduction in acceleration.
It was more than debris on the runway, though that was the primary cause. Beyond the debris:
- Air France had repaired the under carriage incorrectly leading to the aircraft drifting sideways on the runway, which is how it ran over debris at the edge of the runway.
- The aircraft was above it's maximum takeoff weight and the Captain knew that, so he committed an offence by taking off at all.
- But it was even heavier than he knew as more luggage had been loaded into the tail, which also meant the centre of gravity was further back than the Captain knew.
- The Captain had the fuel tanks filled brim full, whereas the design called for there always being an air gap to allow for expansion and contraction. The lack of that air gap is why the wing ruptured when the shredded tyre hit it, if the air gap had been there as required there would have been no fire.
- Once the fire started the crew shutdown both engines on that wing, despite one of them still providing full thrust. You never shutdown engines during early climbout even if they are on fire, precisely because they may be still giving thrust you don't know about.
Like most aviation accidents it was far from one thing, it was a catalogue of mistakes and deliberate rule breaking that caused the Concorde crash.